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INTRODUCTION
As they do each year, Michigan courts decided a number of com-
mercial law cases during the survey period. Several of the cases are
significant opinions which either raise questions or carry significant
implications for Michigan's commercial lawyers. This survey selects
those significant cases, attempts to answer the questions raised, and
probes the implications of the decisions.
I. PERFECTING THE SECURITY INTEREST
Perfection of a creditor's security interest is a critical step in the
process of achieving protection against third parties. Although a
security interest may attach without perfection,1 and even though a
security agreement generally is binding on third parties, 2 specific pro-
visions of Article 9 render the unperfected security interest subor-
dinate to the rights of lien creditors,3 the trustee in bankruptcy, 4 and
tProfessor of Law, Wayne State University. Member of the Illinois,
Massachusetts and Michigan Bars; LL.B., 1965, University of Illinois-ED.
1. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)-(2) sets forth the requirements for attachment, i.e., for
creation of the security interest. (Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Uniform
Commercial Code are to the Code as adopted in Michigan at MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 440.1101-.1110 (1967 & Supp. 1980-81)).
2. U.C.C. § 9-201 stipulat6es that unless the Code provides otherwise, "a
security agreement is effective . . .against purchasers of the collateral and against
creditors."
3. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
4. The Code gives the trustee the rights of a lien creditor. See U.C.C. §
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other perfected secured parties. 5 Perfection, then, is a matter com-
mercial lawyers watch closely.
In International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Vos 6 the court of ap-
peals confronted the difficult task of determining the point in time at
which the creditor must determine the action necessary to perfect his
security interest properly. The problem stems from the fact that the
Code provisions assume a static situation. 7 While most secured trans-
actions fit the assumed model, frequently the situation is fluid.
The difficulty begins at the very heart of Article 9 in the provisions
that define the time at which a security interest attaches and the time
a security interest becomes perfected. Under section 9-203(1) there are
three elements a secured party must satisfy before his security interest
comes into being, i.e., attaches: first, the statute of frauds rule which
requires either a written security agreement describing the collateral
and signed by the debtor or the secured party's possession of the col-
lateral pursuant to agreement; second, the requirement that value be
given; and third, the requirement that the debtor have rights in the
collateral. For purposes of this analysis the critical provision is section
9-203(2), which stipulates that unless the parties agree otherwise, as
they rarely do, attachment occurs at the time when the last of the
three elements is satisfied.8
The Code follows a similar pattern in defining the time when a
security interest becomes perfected. The Code first establishes various
methods of perfection. 9 It then provides that a security interest is
perfected when it has attached and when the steps for perfection have
been satisfied.10 If the perfection step occurs before attachment, fur-
thermore, perfection itself occurs at the time of attachment." When
we put the attachment and perfection provisions together, it becomes
clear that perfection will not occur until all of the events necessary for
attachment have occurred.
Three examples illustrate the problem. In a purchase money loan,
the lender customarily will ask the debtor to sign a security agreement
9-301(3). More importantly, the strong arm clause of the Bankruptcy Code, a federal
statute, gives the trustee such rights. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1)
(Supp. III 1979).
5. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
6. 95 Mich. App. 45, 290 N.W.2d 401 (1980).
7. The Code, however, does provide for the multiple state transaction. See
U.C.C. § 9-103.
8. The parties may agree to postpone attachment only until some time after
all of the elements are satisfied. To permit the parties to agree that attachment occurs
before the three requirements are satisfied would violate the obvious reason of § 9-203.
See U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1, which indicates that proper construction of the Code
requires courts to read the sections according to their reason.
9. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -304, -305, -306.
10. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1).
11. "If such steps are taken before the security interest attaches, it is perfected
at the time when it attaches." Id.
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and a financing statement before the debtor buys the equipment.
Code priority rules commend this procedure by giving the lender its
purchase money priority only if the lender files within certain prescrib-
ed time limits.1 2 The careful lender will often not advance funds,
then, unless he has already taken steps to insure compliance with those
limits so that his security interest attaches, is perfected, and enjoys
priority as soon as those funds are disbursed.13
In this example it is important to note that the perfection and at-
tachment occur simultaneously either at the time the debtor acquires
rights in the collateral14 or at the time the lender disburses the funds,
whichever is later. That point is the first time at which all three
elements of the attachment provision have been satisfied.
The purchase money situation is not the only one in which lenders
might file a financing statement before the security interest attaches.
Frequently a borrower will ask for credit on existing assets. Again, the
lender is concerned about its priority. If the debtor has the collateral
in its possession, the rules of Article 9 grant priortiy to the creditor
who files first.' s The lender, then, will want to take steps to insure that
its filing is first. The most efficient procedure is to file a financing
statement, take a signed security agreement, and search for filings. If
the search discloses that the lender's filing is the earliest, the lender
may then disburse loan proceeds confident that it enjoys a first priori-
12. If the collateral is inventory, the lender must file before the debtor receives
possession of the inventory. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(a). If the collateral is not inventory, the
creditor must file within ten days after the debtor receives possession. U.C.C. §
9-312(4). Cf. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (which gives the purchase money lender priority over
lien creditors and buyers in bulk if he files no later than ten days after the debtor
receives possession). Of course, if the collateral is consumer goods, no filing is
necessary. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
13. The purchase money lender may insist on paying for the goods directly or
on putting the seller's name on the loan proceeds check all in order to satisfy the pur-
chase money security interest definition. See U.C.C. § 9-107.
14. Courts have had some trouble determining when such rights arise. Section
2-501(1) suggests strongly that such rights arise as soon as the goods are identified to
the debtor's contract. Cf. Goldberg Co. v. County Green Ltd. Partnership (In re
County Green Ltd. Partnership), 438 F. Supp. 693, 696 (W.D. Va. 1977); Rex Finan-
cial Corp. v. Mobile America Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 177-78, 580 P.2d 8, 9-10 (1978);
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 133 Ga. App. 488,
493-94, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1974); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill.
App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261,
270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533-34 (1968); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 404
A.2d 842, 844 (R.I. 1979) (buyer's rights arise on identification). But see United States
v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1974); General Elec. Credit
Corp. v. Tidwell Indus., Inc., 115 Ariz. 362, 364, 565 P.2d 868, 870 (1977); First Nat'l
Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 80-81, 86 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1972) (debtor first ac-
quires rights in the goods upon delivery). See also Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Gaucher,
79 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 314, 386 N.E.2d 1052 (1979) (court ignores buyer's special
property on identification; no disposition of mobile home until delivery).
15. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
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ty. Again we see that filing may occur early in the transaction. Attach-
ment and perfection arise in this illustration when the lender gives
value by disbursing the loan proceeds, that disbursement being the
last of the three elements of attachment to take place.
The third illustration involves after-acquired property. It is most
common for lenders (especially inventory lenders) to take a security
agreement which includes after-acquired property. In such a situa-
tion, the security interest in the after-acquired property attaches and
becomes perfected at the time the debtor acquires an interest in that
property.
All three of these examples are common in the commercial set-
ting, and it may very well be that secured lenders file early more often
than they file late. These rules and practices, however, can cause con-
fusion. The problem stems from the fact that the perfection and filing
rules of Article 9 turn on the nature of the collateral and the nature of
the debtor. The Code provides one perfection rule for inventory and
another for equipment. 16 It provides different perfection rules when
the collateral is consumer goods, 7 a class of goods determined in part
by the status of the debtor. 18 It also provides for the filing of a financ-
ing statement in one place if the goods are farm products, a
characterization which depends in part on the status of the debtor, 9
and another if they are inventory; 20 one place if they are equipment
used in farming operations, another if they are used in manufacture. 21
These rules reflect a number of policies, some of them ques-
tionable, 22 but practicing lawyers must deal with the rules, often at
their peril. There is no serious problem if at the time of filing, at the
time of attachment, and at all times in between the nature of the col-
lateral and the debtor do not change. The problem arises when
something does change.
In all three of these illustrations, the secured party will file at a
time before the security interest can be perfected. Since a filing is good
for five years, 23 therefore, the period between the time of filing and
the time of perfection may run from one day to five years. It thus
16. Compare U.C.C. § 9-312(3) with U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
17. Compare U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3) & (4) with U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
18. Only a consumer may own consumer goods. See U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
19. Farm products are such only if they are in the possession of "a debtor
engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations." U.C.C. §
9-109(3).
20. See U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (Second Alternative Subsection), No. 53, [1980]
Mich. Pub. Acts.
21. Id.
22. Most commentators would prefer to see central filing and thereby avoid
the confusion. It is difficult to justify the dual filing system in an age of rapid and
cheap communication. The Michigan Legislature recently amended § 9-401 but did
not alter its dual filing scheme. See No. 53, [1980], Mich. Pub. Acts.
23. See U.C.C. § 9-403(2), No. 53, [1980] Mich. Pub. Acts.
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becomes critical for the courts to decide which date to use in deter-
mining the effectiveness of the filing.
The leading case is In re Pelletier. 24 There a secured party filed a
financing statement in VanBuren, Maine after the debtor had moved
from the town 25 but before he had taken up permanent residence
elsewhere. When the goods were delivered, however, the court seemed
to assume that the debtor's permanent residence was Benton, Maine.
The court also assumed that perfection and attachment occurred
upon delivery and saw the issue as one of deciding whether the date of
filing or the date of attachment should serve as the time for determin-
ing whether the filing was good. The court opted for the date of at-
tachment, reasoning that subsequent parties would face undue search
burdens if they had to search in all places where the debtor had lived
during the preceding five years.
In re Knapp26 adopted the same attachment rule but implicitly
raised questions about the Pelletier rationale. In Knapp the debtor
moved from Fulton County to Herkimer County after the security in-
terest attached whereas in Pelletier the debtor moved before it attach-
ed. The Knapp creditor filed in Fulton County, and the attachment
rule imposed the very search burdens the Pelletier court sought to
avoid. The Knapp court accepted the Pelletier rule by using the time
of attachment as the time for determining the efficacy of the filing but
implicitly rejected the Pelletier rationale by imposing the burdensome
search requirement.
Thus the Knapp case illustrates the weakness of the Pelletier
analysis. The fact is that the attachment rule is neutral: sometimes it
imposes burdens on the secured party by requiring him to refile or to
withhold filing until he knows where the debtor will live at the time of
attachment, and sometimes it requires the subsequent party to search
in the debtor's prior place of residence.
Both the Pelletier and Knapp courts looked to other Code provi-
sions for some clue to the proper rule. Ironically the Pelletier court
found Code support for its rule against the secured party, and the
Knapp court found Code support for its rule in favor of the secured
party. The signals do indeed conflict. Generally, the Code does not
impose a burden on the secured party to monitor the activity of the
debtor for changes, after filing, in residence or in the use of the col-
24. 5 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 327 (D. Me. 1968). Then Referee in Bankruptcy and
now Bankruptcy Judge Conrad Cyr authored the Pelletier opinion.
25. Maine's version of § 9-401 required filing with the town clerk in the town
where the debtor resided. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, § 9-401(1) (repealed
1969). Maine has since adopted the first alternative subsection to § 9-401 and thereby
avoided a repeat of the problem in Pelletier. The first alternative subsection generally
requires central filing with the secretary of state. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 11, §
9-401(1) [1979].
26. 575 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1978).
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lateral. 27 At the same time the Code does impose a duty on a secured
party to refile if the debtor makes a name change that would cause
confusion and if the security agreement covers property acquired more
than four months after the name change. 28 The Code hints, further-
more, that the character of the property at the time of attachment,
not filing, determines the proper place to file. 29 Finally, Comment 3 to
section 9-401 says that the courts should use the last event test of sec-
tion 9-103(1)(b) in determining whether local filing is required and
suggests, therefore, that the last event (attachment in our three il-
lustrations) might also control the place of local filing.30
In light of these conflicting signals, courts should adopt a rule
which best satisfies the realities of secured lending. Such a test would
favor a fesult in Vos different from the attachment rule the majority
fashioned. In Vos the residence of Blaser, the buyer of a farm tractor,
changed. At the time he entered into the contract and security agree-
ment, Blaser lived in Ionia County but planned to farm in Barry
County. The company that financed the purchase filed a financing
statement in Barry County. Blaser, however, took delivery of the trac-
tor while he was living in Ionia County and then moved to Barry
County.
The Michigan version of the Code provides that a financing state-
ment covering equipment used in farming operations must be filed in
the office of the Register of Deeds in the county of the debtor's
residence.31 The Vos security interest attached at the time the buyer
acquired an interest in the collateral, 32 that being the last of the three
elements necessary for attachment. At that point the debtor resided in
Ionia County, and the court of appeals held that at that point the
finance company should have filed in Ionia County. Since it filed in
Barry County, the filing was no good, the security interest was
unperfected, and purchasers from Blaser would defeat the finance
company.33
27. See U.C.C. § 9-401(3), No. 53, [1980] Mich. Pub. Acts. But cf § 9-103(1)(d)
(requires refiling if the debtor moves the goods into another state).
28. See U.C.C. § 9-402(7), No. 53, [1980] -Mich. Pub. Acts.
29. The hint is a weak one. Section 9-105(1)(h) defines "goods" as "things
which are movable at the time the security interest attaches."
30. One court, in fact, rejected both the time of filing rule and the time of
perfection rule in favor of a last event rule. See Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v.
Fedders Financial Corp. (In re Hammons), 614 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1980).
31. § 9-401(1) (Second Alternative Subsection (1)), No. 53, [1980] Mich. Pub.
Acts.
32. The majority opinion in Vos assumed that the buyer's interest arose upon
delivery. In fact, under § 2-501, it may have arisen earlier. See note 14 supra. The
distinction, however, is of no moment here. The buyer apparently lived in Ionia Coun-
ty from the time he entered into the purchase contract until after he took delivery.
Thus he lived in Ionia County when his interest arose, whether it arose on identifica-
tion or on delivery.
33. The purchasers included buyers, the Voses, and the bank to which they
,granted a security interest. The Vos opinion suggests that the Voses won under
[Vol. 27:589
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The question is a close one. The Code itself provides no specific
answer; it is proper, therefore, that the courts fashion a rule consistent
with the general policies of the Code.34 The majority in Vos felt that
the filing scheme of the Code should provide certainty and that by
picking attachment, an event whose time is fixed by the Code, the
court gave subsequent parties more certainty in searching for filings
and filing parties more certainty on where to file.
The majority placed considerable reliance on In re Pelletier and
ignored the analytical weakness of Pelletier even though the dissent in
Vos decried that analysis. Vos, moreover, provided an opportunity to
resolve the policy inconsistency of Knapp and Pelletier. In Vos the
secured party had anticipated the debtor's move and ostensibly tried
to facilitate a search which always begins with the farmer's home
county.35 That conduct seems reasonably designed not to mislead. In
fact, the Code mandates such anticipation when a debtor buys goods
and promptly moves them to a state different from their situs at the
time of attachment . 6
Finally, Vos gave the court a way to distinguish Pelletier and
Knapp, in which the secured party filed at the debtor's old residence.
In Vos the secured party filed at his new one. The Vos trial court and
the dissent argued that a filing is good so long as there is at one time a
unity of the requirements for perfection. We must concede that under
Pelletier and Knapp the Barry County filing was not good to perfect
the security interest so long as the debtor had not moved to Barry
County; but once he moved there, the filing should suffice. Such a
rule does not impose any heavier burden on a searching party, who
must search in Barry County to determine whether the debtor created
any security interests after he moved there. Certainly it is fair to hold
the secured *party unperfected during the period prior to the debtor's
move, but it seems unfair to hold him unperfected after the move.
This analysis does not disregard the legislature's expressed policy
in favor of national uniformity in construing the Code. 7 Pelletier and
Knapp come from authoritative sources, but the cases are split, with
§ 9-301(1)(b) because they were lien creditors. In fact they were not lien creditors. See
U.C.C. § 9-301(3). Presumably, however, they were buyers who gave value and took
possession without knowledge of the security interest. In such event they would defeat
the finance company under § 9-301(1)(c). Their bank, of course, a perfected secured
party, would defeat the finance company under §§ 9-301(1)(a) and 9-312(5)(a).
34. The Code's general policies are set forth in § 1-102.
35. Any careful lender must search the home county even if he knows that the
debtor obtained the goods while residing in another county. The debtor could have
granted a second security interest after the move, in which event both Pelletier and
Knapp mandate filing in the new county.
36. See U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(c).
37. The legislature has designated such uniformity one of the underlying pur-
poses and policies of the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-10 2 (2 )(c).
1981]
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some rejecting the Pelletier/Knapp approach.38 Those who support
Pelletier and Knapp must do so not because they make searching any
easier but because they provide certainty for all parties. That certainty
is not disturbed, however, by making an exception to their attachment
oriented rule in the Vos situation. A creditor who anticipates a move
and files in the county where the debtor is going to live takes the risk of
being unperfected before the move. After the move, however, the uni-
ty rule rejected by the majority in Vos would mislead no one and
would reward the creditor who tries to make searching easier.
The certainty rationale of Pelletier and Knapp is suspect anyway.
As the discussion of attachment above suggests, the time of attach-
ment is not easy to determine, and a careful lender will find it far
easier to investigate the history of his debtor's residence and search for
filings than to determine the dates (and residences on these dates)
when security interests attached to the various goods against which the
debtor seeks to borrow. The lender must make the former inquiry in
any event to guard against interstate moves.
39
Central filing would obviate most of the problems. The state of
Maine has avoided the Pelletier rule by altering section 9-401 .40 Unless
the Michigan legislature makes a similar change, commercial lawyers
in Michigan will have to contend with the Pelletier- Vos line of authori-
ty, and careful farm lenders will have to search in all counties where
the debtor resided during the preceding five years.
II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
It is a well-settled principle of commercial law that a failing enter-
prise may borrow against its assets. In fact, through its purchase
money priority rules, 41 the Code facilitates such borrowing, at times to
38. Compare In re Knapp, 575 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1978); In re O'Donnell, 7
U.C.C. REP. SERv. 888 (D. Me. 1970); In re Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 327 (D.
Me. 1968); In re Kane, 1 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1962), with Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp. v. Fedders Financial Corp. (In re Hammons), 614 F.2d 399 (5th
Cir. 1980); John Deere Co. v. Castonguay (In re Castonguay), [1979] 4 SECURED
TRANS. GUIDE J 53,415 (D. Me. 1979); Schoel v. Oak Cliff Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Roy), 21 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 325 (N.D. Ala. 1977); In re Page, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
250 (W.D. Ky. 1968); In re Golden Kernel, Inc., 5 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 43 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
39. Section 9-103 contains provisions that require lenders to search in states
from which the debtor moved.
40. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-401 (Supp. 1979-80). See also John Deere
Co. v. Castonguay (In re Castonguay), [1979] 4 SECURED TRANS. GUIDE 53,415 (D.
Me. 1979) (in which Judge Johnson implicitly rejects Judge Cyr's attachment rule in
favor of a unity rule such as that urged by the dissent in Vos); see note 25 supra.
41. Sections 9-312(3) & (4) grant security interest priority to creditors who pro-
vide the credit that enables the debtor to acquire the secured assets. See U.C.C. §
9-107 (which defines "purchase money security interest").
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the detriment of some of the debtor's creditors. 42 In the classic setting,
a business facing angry creditors will raise cash by borrowing against
existing assets. Sometimes, however, the debtor will keep his hounding
creditors at bay by granting them a security interest in return for their
promise to refrain from collection measures. The Code recognizes this
latter practice and accepts the creditor's promise of restraint as value
adequate to support a security agreement. 43
In rare cases a debtor may use these rules in a fashion that reflects
an intent to "hinder" his creditors, thereby obtaining more leverage
than the law is willing to give. In A.M. McCarthy & Sons Co. v.
Cooney Engineering Co., 44 the circuit court for Oakland County con-
fronted such a situation. In McCarthy the debtor, a failing company,
granted a security interest in all of its assets, including after-acquired
property, to those creditors who would agree to stay and subordinate
their claims. Eventually eighty-four of the debtor's ninety-five
creditors entered into the arrangement. These creditors then sought a
permanent injunction to restrain one of the dissenting creditors from
enforcing its claim against property subject to the alleged security
interest.
45
The court's opinion recites that the arrangement creditors took
their security interest on June 25, 1978 but did not file a financing
statement until June 28, 1979, more than one year later. The dissen-
ting creditor obtained its judgment on August 10, 1978. On that date,
then, the dissenting creditor could become a lien creditor under the
Code; 46 on the same date, the arrangement creditors were unperfected
secured parties. 47 Given these characterizations of the parties, the
Code would grant priority to the dissenting lien creditor. 48
42. The purchase money priority rules disappoint the revolving lender who
takes a security interest in after-acquired property and then finds that the later, pur-
chase money lender enjoys priority. See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3) & (4).
43. No security interest may attach until the creditor gives value. U.C.C.
§ 9-203(l)(b). The Code stipulates that a secured party gives value when he acquires
his interest "as security for.., a pre-existing claim." U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b). Thus the
Code's definition of value departs from the more rigorous contract standard which
would not permit the taking of security for a pre-existing claim to constitute considera-
tion. A debtor may approach a single creditor, negotiate an extension and grant the
creditor a security interest which is valid. See A. M. McCarthy & Sons Co. v. Cooney
Eng'r Co., No. 79-184-842 CZ (Oakland County Cir. Ct. 1980); notes 44-45 & accom-
panying text infra. See also In re United Fuel & Supply. Co., 250 Mich. 325, 230 N.W.
164 (1930).
44. No. 79-184-842 CZ (Oakland County Cir. Ct. 1980).
45. By virtue of the fact that the security interest here was not for the benefit
of all creditors and thereby preferred some creditors, the assignment did not fall
within the scope of the statute regulating assignments for the benefit of creditors, and
the McCarthy court so held. See MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 600.5201 (1968).
46. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (definition of "lien creditor").
47. The arrangement creditors' security interest was unperfected until the fil-
ing in June of 1979. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), -303(1).
48. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
1981]
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For reasons not discussed in the opinion the court did not pursue
this Article 9 analysis, but it reached the same result by invoking a
statutory provision relating to fraudulent conveyances. That statute
provides that "[e]very conveyance ... made with the intent to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors . ..shall be void. ' 49 The McCarthy court
concluded that this debtor did in fact act with such intent.
The opinion is sound. It draws on cases from Michigan and
elsewhere, all of which support it, and it achieves a commercially
desirable result. The key to the analysis is the court's characterization
as coercive the debtor-imposed condition that only those creditors who
agreed to stay and subordinate their claims ,would benefit from the
security interest. Such a condition does delay and hinder, thus satisfy-
ing the elements of the statute, the court ruled.
The leading Michigan case is an old one. In Wood v. Eldredge"°
the debtor granted a chattel mortgage only to those creditors who
agreed to extend the time for paying debts. Such a condition, the
court held, hindered and delayed those creditors who did not agree to
the extension by preventing them from proceeding against the mort-
gaged property.
At first blush the rule appears to be a curious one. We know that,
absent an intent to defraud, a debtor may prefer one creditor over
another.5 ' Plainly, however, the debtor who makes that preference5 2
after exacting a creditor's promise to extend the time for payment or
to forgive a portion of the debt has hindered and delayed that
creditor. Yet it is not that creditor whom the rule of the McCarthy
case protects,53 but the creditor who refused to accept the condition
and who is hindered as well. Thus the dissenting creditor upsets the
conveyance under the McCarthy rule when the debtor exacts the con-
dition from the consenting creditors but may not upset the conveyance
when the debtor prefers creditors without exacting the concessions. In
short, the dissenting creditor wins or loses not on his merits but on the
elements of the debtor's "fraudulent" conduct.
49. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 566.221 (1967). Cf. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT § 7; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 566.17 (1967) (appears to impose
the same sanction against similar conduct).
50. 147 Mich. 554, 111 N.W. 168 (1907).
51. See, e.g., Geisert v. Corriveau, 140 F. Supp. 29, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1956);
Warner v. Longwell, 261 Mich. 468, 472, 246 N.W. 188, 189 (1933); In re United
Fuel & Supply Co., 250 Mich. 325, 331, 230 N.W. 164, 166 (1930); Ferris v. Mc-
Queen, 94 Mich. 367, 373, 54 N.W. 164, 166-67 (1892).
52. Bankruptcy rules may, of course, bear on the success of any such attempt
by the debtor. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. III 1979). Those con-
siderations, however, do not bear on the fradulent conveyance aspects of the McCar-
thy case where there was apparently no bankruptcy, nor in the many cases in which
such a preference does not fall within the arnbit of § 547 and, therefore, is not
voidable under that section of the federal statute.
53. Arguably, however, either a dissenting or accepting creditor should be able
to upset the conveyance. See generally 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES &
PREFERENCES §§ 111-117 (rev. ed. 1940).
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In its early days, commercial law fashioned rules against the
fraudulent assignment.5 4 Those rules recognized fraud costs. In order
to minimize those costs, the courts and legislatures"5 penalized 6 par-
ties who engage in activity of questionable commercial value. The law,
then, uses the dissenting creditor as an enforcer in order to inhibit the
practice of extorting favorable treatment from some creditors. The
failing company will often have the economic strength to exact such
favor. The legislature, however, interdicts the use of that strength.
Such strength arises out of the threat of bankruptcy with its attendant
delay and expense. To permit a debtor to profit from the threat of
bankruptcy thereby hindering some of his creditors is a course the law
has wisely eschewed. Certainly all creditors may agree to delay and
forgive payment, but some creditors and the debtor may not through
this mutual arrangement prevent the dissenting creditor from pursu-
ing the debtor's property. 57
The McCarthy case, then, demonstrates the continued vitality of
legislation that predates the Uniform Commercial Code by many
years. 58 In section 1-103 s9 the Code anticipates this type of concert
between Code and non-Code legislation. The McCarthy case illus-
trates that concert well and serves as a timely reminder that statutes
relating to fraudulent conveyances play a significant role in sup-
plementing the Code.
The distinction that McCarthy makes is worth noting. Nothing in
the Code or the anti-fraud statutes prohibits a failing company from
using assets to stave off insolvency, 60 but when the debtor uses his
assets with the intent to hinder or delay some creditors, he runs afoul
54. The classic legislative response is the Statute of 13 Elizabeth (13 Eliz. c. 5(1570)), but the statute was a codification of what had been the common law. See
Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337, 339 (N.Y. 1812).
55. The UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACT or similar statutes have
been enacted in most jurisdictions. See generally 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CON-
VEYANCES AND PRMFERENCES § 62 (rev. ed. 1940).
56. Cf. Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601) (Twyne, the grantor
of a fraudulent conveyance, was convicted of the crime of fraud and his friends, who
resisted the sheriff, of riot).
57. In theory the McCarthy rule permits creditor A to withhold his consent
and force the other creditors into agreeing with the debtor to give A favorable treat-
ment. Such conduct reflects market forces as most commerical agreements do. The
commercial evil to which the McCarthy rule addresses itself is the evil of affecting a
party's right without his agreement. .When the parties agree, the legislature leaves
them alone.
58. The earliest Michigan predecessor of § 566.221 was enacted in 1846. See
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 566.221 (1967).
59. "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to con-
tract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103.
60. Clearly, then, nothing in McCarthy prevents a debtor from granting a
security interest to one creditor and not to others, so long as the debtor's conduct does
not reflect the forbidden intent. See note 51 supra.
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of the anti-fraud rules. A debtor who invites his creditors to make con-
cessions and then conveys assets to those who do, moreover, has
evidenced such unlawful intent.
III. SUBROGATION RIGHTS
The doctrine of subrogation, a creature of equity, also sup-
plements the rules of the Code by virtue of the legislative command in
section 1-103. Two problems tend to recur, however, as the policy of
this equitable notion intersects with the policies of the Code itself, for
the Code emanates from equity's stricter cousin, the common law. The
first problem is one of distinguishing subrogation rights from rights
arising out of the Code, particularly Article 9. The second problem is
one of fashioning priority rules when legal rights and equitable rights
confront each other. Two cases during the survey period reflect these
recurring questions.
There is a tendency among commercial lawyers to mischaracterize
interests which are in fact security interests but which the parties have
wittingly or unwittingly disguised. Thus some courts fail to distinguish
between a true lease and a lease-purchase 1 or between retention of
title6 2 and retention of a security interest.63 The Code treats all securi-
ty devices as security interests and renders all of them subject to the
rules of Article 9.64
In American Oil Co. v. L.A. Davidson, Inc.6 5 the court of appeals
confronted the claim of a lien creditor that it defeated a contractor's
surety which, the lien creditor argued, was an unperfected secured
party. In fact, the surety had taken a security interest in the accounts
of the contractor and had perfected its security interest by filing.
When the filing lapsed, 66 however, the surety failed to refile and its
61. See, e.g., United Road Machinery Co. v. Jasper, 568 S.W.2d 242 (Ky.
App. 1978). But see Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 53 Mich. App.
359, 220 N.W.2d 83 (1974); John Deere Co. v. Wonderland Realty Corp., 38 Mich.
App. 88, 195 N.W.2d 871 (1972); Nickell v. Lambrecht, 29 Mich. App. 191, 185
N.W.2d 155 (1970) (Michigan appellate courts were quick to look through the lease
and find a security agreement). See generally U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (distinguishes true
leases from security interests).
62. It is misleading, of course, to use the term "retention of title" in the sale
context, since the Code specifies that such retention operates as a security interest. See
U.C.C. § 2-401(1).
63. See, e.g., International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank,
296 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1974); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. First Security Bank, 534 P.2d 900
(Utah 1975).
64. "Except as otherwise provided in section 9-104 on excluded transactions,
this Article applies ... to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents,
instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts .... ".U.C.C. §
9-102(I)(a).
65. 95 Mich. App. 358, 290 N.W.2d 144 (1980).




security interest then became unperfected 67 and subordinate to the in-
terest of the lien creditor. 68 The surety countered that in addition to
its rights under Article 9, it also enjoyed the benefits of equitable
subrogation. Thus the court confronted the question of whether the
equitable right of subrogation is a security interest subject to the
priority rules of Article 9. The court correctly answered the question
in the negative, refused to apply Article 9, and utilized rules of equity
to hold in favor of the surety.
The American Oil case is consistent with prevailing authority. The
leading case is National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co. 69 in which the surety for a defaulting contractor used a subroga-
tion theory to claim proceeds from the contract. The contractor's
bank, which had taken a peFrfected security interest in the contract
proceeds, contended that both parties were in fact secured parties and
that the bank prevailed because it was perfected and the surety was
not. If the court had accepted the bank's characterization of the sure-
ty's claim, the bank would have prevailed under the priority rules of
Article 9.70 The Shawmut court, however, specifically rejected that
argument and refused to apply Article 9 rules. It looked instead to the
law of equitable subrogation and concluded that under that doctrine,
the surety which completes the work of the defaulting contractor is en-
titled not only to sums due for work completed by the surety after
default but also to unpaid sums earned by the contractor before
default. These latter funds should go to the surety, the court reasoned,
because equity subrogrates the surety not only to the rights of the
defaulting contractor but also to the rights of the owner.7 1
The Shawmut court reasoned that an owner need not pay to a
defaulting contractor sums already earned if those funds are needed to
complete the contract. Thus, when the surety steps into the shoes of
the owner via subrogation, the surety need not pay those funds to the
defaulting contractor or to the defaulting contractor's bank. It is im-
portant to note that prior to default the bank had a perfected security
interest in those earned funds. The surety's right to the funds does not
arise until after default, yet the surety prevailed in the Shawmut case.
The second leading case, the one on which the Michigan court
relied, is Canter v. Schlager,72 a Massachusetts case. That opinion
held squarely that the right of subrogation is not a security interest
and not subject to the priority rules of Article 9.
67. "Upon lapse the security interest becomes unperfected . Id.
68. Id. See also U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (implies the same rule).
69. 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969).
70. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(a), -312(5)(a).
71. In fact, the court held that the surety is also subrogated to the rights of
subcontractors and suppliers it paid under the surety bond. Thus broad, then, is the
surety's right of subrogation. See National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Gas.
Co., 411 F.2d 843, 845 (1st Cir. 1969).
72. 358 Mass. 789, 267 N.E.2d 492 (1971).
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In the American Oil case, the Michigan court expressly adopted
the holding common to Canter and National Shawmut that subroga-
tion rights are governed by equitable rules and not Code rules. 73 In
doing so it followed the weight of authority. 
7 4
In the second subrogation case the court of appeals had somewhat
less success. Earl Dubey & Sons, Inc. v. Macomb Contracting Corp."
involved a surety and a secured party (whose interests were aligned by
virtue of an indemnification arrangement) on the one hand and a gar-
nishing creditor on the other. The subject of the dispute was sums
earned by the contractor but unpaid by the owner. The court con-
sidered the following dates to be critical: the bank filed its financing
statement on March 13, 1978; the judgment creditor served its gar-
nishment writ on July 31, 1978; and the contractor defaulted on
August 18, 1978. The court adopted a "first-in-time, first-in-right"
approach and held first that the garnishment rights of the creditor
defeated the subrogation rights of the surety (these subrogation rights
having arisen no earlier than the date of default) and second that the
security interest of the bank defeated the garnishment, the writ having
been served after the bank filed its financing statement.
Although the facts of Earl Dubey are unique, the holding implici-
tly rejects the American Oil decision and flies in the face of the Na-
tional Shawmut line of authority. The Earl Dubey court's first-in-time,
first-in-right approach stems from contract and property law, not
equity; by positing the dates of filing as the critical dates for determin-
ing the bank's rights, furthermore, the court invoked an Article 9
priority rule.7 6 Under the first rule of contract conveyancing law, a
grantor cannot give what he does not have.7 7 Thus under contract law
the garnishing creditor cannot in July obtain from the debtor what the
debtor gave to t1:e bank the previous March. By the same brand of
contract-conveyancing analysis, the surety whose rights arise in August
cannot defeat the earlier conveyances. 78 This analysis, however,
derives strictly from "law," not equity, and by employing it, the court
73. 95 Mich. App. 358, 361, 290 N.W.2d 144, 145 (1980). The surety retained
its equitable right of subrogation even though it had at one time filed a financing
statement under the Code and had later failed to renew it.
74. For a collection of the cases, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 889 n.93 (2d ed. 1980).
75. 97 Mich. App. 553, 296 N.W.2d 582 (1980).
76. Article 9 employs the first-in-time rule in U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a), its omnibus
priority provision, and, moreover, uses the date of filing to determine priority for most
non-possessory security interests.
77. "[N]emo plus juris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet" (No one
may transfer more rights than he enjoys himself). Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns.
471, 479 (N.Y. 1806).
78. For a more complete discussion of these contract conveyancing rules, see
Dolan, The U. C. C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59
B.U.L. REv. 811 (1979).
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ignored the Code's stipulation that rules of equity supplement Code
rules. 79
Clearly neither the National Shawmut case nor the Canter case
adopt contract principles. In the National Shawmut case, moreover,
the surety succeeded in its claim to proceeds earned before the right of
subrogation arose and earned at a time when the surety's antagonist,
the secured party, had a perfected security interest in those contract
proceeds. A first-in-time approach in Shawmut would have yielded a
rule for the bank, but the Shawmut court held for the surety.
In addition, the rule of the Earl Dubey case conflicts with the
general line of authority that holds that the contractor's surety defeats
the contractor's bank.80 That line of cases, properly rejecting Article 9
analysis as the Michigan court did in American Oil, uses subrogation
theory to elevate the surety's interest above the earlier filed security in-
terest of the bank. Earl Dubey, of course, does not address the secured
party/surety dispute directly, but the implication is manifest. Earl
Dubey holds that the secured party bank defeats the garnishment
creditor, who defeats the surety. It follows from that holding that the
secured party bank defeats the surety-a result opposite to that of Na-
tional Shawmut.
It may be argued, of course, that National Shawmut is wrong. Yet
the Earl Dubey case is not persuasive on that point. The opinion does
not address the question and does not reflect a conscious decision to
reverse the National Shawmut rule, and it would be a distinct disser-
vice to the cause of legal certainty for future Michigan courts to read
Earl Dubey as breaking with a significant body of precedent. 81 We
cannot deny, however, that Earl Dubey carries such an implication.
IV. PRODUCTs LIABILITY
This final section considers the gentle suggestion by a federal court
that Michigan put its products liability house in order and offers a
proposed resolution of the current confusion.
In Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 2 a diversity action, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted a claim by fish
farmers that their supplier sold infected fish and contaminated the
plaintiffs' entire stock. The plaintiffs took four deliveries, three of
79. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
80. See note 74 supra.
81. The issue is not an easy one. Should courts burden banks, as National
Shawmut does, and increase the cost of construction financing? Or should courts
burden sureties and increase the cost of construction bonds? Given these claims of the
banking and the insurance industries, courts are well-advised above all to fashion a
rule that yields certainty so that only the industry so burdened will incur the cost.
Without certainty the price of both financing and bonding will reflect the uncertainty.
. 82. 604 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1979).
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which occurred more than four years prior to the time the plaintiffs
filed their complaint, and expert testimony established that the diseas-
ed fish could have been included in any or all of the deliveries.
The defendant asserted a statute of limitations defense under sec-
tion 2-725, which limits recovery to claims brought within four years
of delivery.83 The defendant argued that it was incumbent on the
plaintiffs to show that the contaminated delivery occurred within the
four year period. The court rejected this defense, however, on the
grounds that the burden was on the defendant to establish the
statutory bar and that by failing to show that the fourth delivery was
untainted the defendant failed to satisfy the burden of the affirmative
defense 84
The opinion accords with Michigan case law on the burden ques-
tion" and is unremarkable but for the opinion's reference to an
unresolved problem with Michigan's statutes of limitations. The court
noted that in addition to the Code's four year statute of limitations for
breach of contract actions Michigan has an earlier statute that deals
with "actions for damages based on breach of a warranty of quality or
fitness .... "86 The four year provision of the Code stipulates that the
cause of action for "breach of warranty" occurs when the seller tenders
delivery.8 7 The latter provision stipulates that the claim for "breach of
a warranty" occurs when the breach is or reasonably should be
discovered.88
Although the Sixth Circuit was relieved at not having had "to
grapple with" the issue,89 Michigan courts and lawyers must. The pro-
blem stems from the fact that Michigan courts, perhaps deliberately,
have confused two causes of action, both of which they call "breach of
warranty."
It is not necessary to recite here the long effort to wrench contract
83. (1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agree-
ment the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year
but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly ex-
tends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must
await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the
breach is or should have been discovered.
U.C.C. § 2-725(1) & (2).
84. 604 F.2d at 993.
85. See, e.g., Locke v. City of Detroit, 335 Mich. 29, 33, 55 N.W.2d 161, 163
(1952); Tumey v. City of Detroit, 316 Mich. 400, 410, 25 N.W.2d 571, 575 (1947).
86. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5833 (1968).
87. U.C.C. § 2-725(2).
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5833 (1968).
89. Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1979).
The court's opinion also refers to an earlier "valiant attempt to devine Michigan law in
this area ...." Id. 992 n.4.
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law from its position of caveat emptor to one more commercially
realistic. We all know that the "citadel" has fallen with the nearly
universal demise of the privity and notice requirements that pro-
hibited claims by remote buyers. In the haste to achieve this desirable
result, however, courts and legislatures may have tripped over each
other. Michigan is the prime example.
At common law a party injured by a defective product may sue in
tort for damages caused by the negligent conduct of the manufacturer
or seller.90 This traditional cause of action, however, arguably poses
significant burdens on the plaintiff, not the least of which is the re-
quirement of showing that the seller or manufacturer was negligent.
Courts responded to plaintiffs' claims that this burden was too heavy
by fashioning a new tort which, among other things, did not require
the injured party to show any such negligence, but rather to show only
that the product was dangerously defective and that the defect caused
the injury.9 1
In most jurisdictions this new, judicially-created tort came to be
known as strict liability in tort.9 2 Unfortunately, the Michigan
supreme court dubbed it "breach of ... warranty, s93 and the era of
confusion had begun.
While courts were fashioning this new tort to relieve the burdens
of injured buyers, the legislatures were also responding, but in con-
tract, not in tort. The contract action was known by its historic name:
"breach of warranty. ' 94 Manufacturers and sellers had attempted to
avoid such contract liability by arguing that they made no warranties.
The legislatures responded by inferring a warranty if the contract was
silent9" and by imposing serious limitations on the seller's attempts to
disclaim any such implied warranty. 96 It is clear, furthermore, that
the Michigan legislature intended to extend the contract breach of
warranty claim to those who might sustain personal injury as a result
of the sale of defective products. The Code stipulates that any contract
which limits consequential damages97 for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie an unconscionable and,
90. The leading case is still MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
91. Prosser, however, takes the position that the proof required in a negligence
case is really no different from that required in a strict liability case or a breach of war-
ranty case. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 671-72 (4th ed. 1971).
92. The Restatement refers to it as "strict liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
93. See, e.g., Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 95, 138
N.W.2d 129, 133 (1965).
94. See UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 14-16; F. POLLOCK, G. WALD & S.
WILLISTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 655 (3d ed. 1906).
95. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, -315.
96. See U.C.C. § 2-316.
97. The Code defines consequential damages to include "injury to person or
property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b).
1981]
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
therefore, unenforceable" provision.99 The Code also lists those per-
sons to whom the protection of those rules extends.100
One final legislative refinement completed the cause of action pic-
ture. Injured plaintiffs complained that the two year statute of limita-
tions for personal injuries yielded unfair results in situations where a
manufacturer or seller delivered defective goods but the defect was la-
tent. Similar arguments had been raised in service cases, and some
courts had held that the cause of action accrues at the time the service
is performed even though the injury does not occur until a later time,
when the statute may have run.' 10 Other courts rejected this view and
held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
plaintiff discovers the defective service or reasonably should have
discovered it.102 These latter decisions in effect held that the cause of
action accrues at the time of the injury, since it was at that time that
the defect usually became apparent for the first time. Michigan
adopted a broad version of the latter rule by statute extending it to ac-
tions for "breach of a warranty .... ,,103
There were two effects of this legislative and judicial reform. First,
we have three causes of action: ordinary negligence, strict liability in
tort, and breach of warranty. Second, we have in Michigan a triad of
limitations statutes: a three-year statute for "actions to recover
damages for injuries to persons and property; 10 4 a four-year statute
for actions for "breach of warranty,"' 05 which runs from the time of
delivery; and a statute which stipulates that the limitations period in a
"breach of warranty" claim begins to run at the time the breach is or
reasonably should be discovered. 10 6
It is important to note that this state of affairs reversed the caveat
emptor rule and rendered sellers and manufacturers virtual insurers of
their customers, both those in privity and those remote. Defendants in
products liability cases had to win three cases. They had to win the or-
dinary negligence claim, the strict tort claim, and the breach of war-
ranty claim. The plaintiff, on the other hand, would recover his
damages10 7 if successful at only one of the three opportunities the
courts and legislature had given him.
98. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (renders an unconscionable provision unenforceable or
enforceable only as the court directs in order to avoid an unconscionable result).
99. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3).
100. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (extends recovery to persons other than the buyer).
101. See, e.g., Essex Wire Corp. v. M.H. Hilt Co., 263 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1959);
Pasquale v. Chandler, 350 Mass. 450, 215 N.E.2d 319 (1966).
102. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248
N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969).
103. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5833 (1968).
104. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(8) (Supp. 1980-81).
105. U.C.C. § 2-725.
106. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5833 (1968).
107. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the question of damages
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The Michigan supreme court evidently thought three tries was one
too many. In Parish v. B.F. Goodrich Co.'10 the plaintiff asserted
causes of action for ordinary negligence and for "breach of warranty,"
the name Michigan gives to both the judicially created tort of strict
liability in tort and the legislatively created contract cause of action
for breach of implied warranty. The Parish court held, in effect, that
the plaintiff had only two causes of action: ordinary negligence and
breach of warranty, and that the Code's four-year statute of limita-
tions did not apply to either. "[I]t was not intended that the time for
commencement of a product-liability action against a manufacturer
depend on whether plaintiffs theory of liability is grounded in tort or
contract."'1 9 In short, Parish held that the remote products liability
plaintiff has a cause of action only for ordinary negligence and for the
judicially created strict liability tort cause of action, which Michigan
courts call "breach of warranty."
This analysis clarifies the statute of limitations problem. It
removes entirely the conflict the Sixth Circuit perceived between the
Code statute, which begins to run at the time of delivery, and the
statute which stipulates that the action accrues when the defect is or
should be discovered. The former applies to contract actions under
the Code and the latter to tort actions in negligence or strict liability.
There remains, of course, the question of whether the court has
not destroyed the contract cause of action for personal injuries and
property damage the legislature intended to create when it adopted
the Code." 0 Certainly the court may in the common law tradition
create causes of action, but it is also certain that the court may not
prefer its judicially created cause of action to that created by the
legislature, unless the legislature has authorized it to do so. In this in-
stance, the legislature has so authorized it. The Parish case involved
the "product liability of a manufacturer, not in direct dealing with
the" plaintiff."' The buyer in Parish, then, was a remote buyer, not a
direct buyer. The legislature has left it to the courts to decide whether
such a buyer should benefit from Code warranties. The Code itself ex-
tends the warranties only to the buyer, his family, household and
guests." 2 It leaves to the courts to decide whether to extend the war-
ranties to remote buyers.'"
and the effect of Michigan's comparative negligence rule in these cases. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2945 & .2949 (Supp. 1980-81).
108. 395 Mich. 271, 235 N.W.2d 570 (1975).
109. Id. at 278, 235 N.W.2d at 572.
110. See text at notes 97-100 supra.
111. 395 Mich. at 279, 235 N.W.2d at 573.
112. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (Alternative A).
113. The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its pro-
visions the family, household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section in this form is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
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The pattern, then, is clear. In Michigan the remote buyer has only
two causes of action against the manufacturer: ordinary negligence
and strict liability in tort, called "breach of warranty" by Michigan
courts. The Code statute of limitations has nothing to do with either of
those causes, which are governed by the three-year statute that com-
mences to run at the time the product defect is or should be
discovered.
In those cases where the plaintiff is in privity with the manufac-
turer or otherwise satisfies the rather narrow scope of section 2-318, he
will enjoy three causes of action: ordinary negligence, strict liability in
tort (called breach of warranty), and breach of warranty under the
Code. The three-year statute applies to the first two and commences
to run at the time the defect is or should be discovered. The Code's
four-year statute applies to the third but commences to run at the time
the goods are delivered.
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
Id. Comment 3.
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